Heythrop College Publications

Lacewing, Michael (2015) Emotion, Perception, and the Self in Moral Epistemology. Dialectica, 69 (3), pp. 335-355. [Journal Article]

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Digital Object Identifier (DOI): 10.1111/1746-8361.12115
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    In this paper, I argue against a perceptual model of moral epistemology. We should not reject the claim that there is a sense in which, on some occasions, emotions may be said to be perceptions of values or reasons. But going further than this, and taking perception as a model for moral epistemology is unhelpful and unilluminating. By focusing on the importance of the dispositions and structures of the self to moral knowledge, I bring out important disanalogies between moral epistemology and typical cases of perceptual expertise. As a result, how we gain, or fail to gain, moral knowledge should not be understood in terms of the operation of a perceptual capacity.

    Item Type: Journal Article
    Journal or Publication Title: Dialectica
    Department: Philosophy
    Depositing User: Vicky Rowley
    Date Deposited: 17 Dec 2015 14:29
    Last Modified: 11 Mar 2016 15:02
    URI: http://publications.heythrop.ac.uk/id/eprint/2254

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